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CASE COMMENTS
federal-state cooperative actions. Inevitably, where these policies conflict,
either the federal courts or the states will have to compromise if an
efficient procedure for joint searches is to emerge. In light of the comity
principles of Stefanelli and in order to promote cooperative actions, it
would appear that federal courts should use their injunctive power more
sparingly in situations involving joint searches. Such reluctance would
prevent disruption of state criminal proceedings, and leave the question of
the admissibility of the evidence discovered in the joint search to the state
courts. Congressional legislation or, more likely, a Supreme Court
decision could go far in alleviating the conflict of the policies which are
brought into play by the federal-state cooperative action.
G. BARKER STEIN, JR.
TAFT-HARTLEY'S ILLEGAL OBJECT TEST AND A
PARTIAL CEASE TO DO BUSINESS
Labor's right to strike and bring concerted pressure on neutral
employers was circumscribed by the secondary boycott provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act.' Section 8(b)(4)(B) 2 states that a union may not engage
in, or induce or encourage employees to engage in, a concerted refusal to
'Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1964). A neutral or
secondary employer is defined as one who is wholly unconnected with a labor dispute
between an employer and his employees. A primary employer is an immediate party to a
dispute with a labor union, and stands in the relationship of employer to the members of that
union. National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
229 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964) is the applicable section which makes it unlawful for a labor
union to exert pressure on a neutral for an unlawful purpose. This section reads in pertinent
part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . (4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce. . . to engage in, a strike
or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services (ii) . . . where . . . an object
thereof is-(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or
bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees
.... Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be
construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary
strike or primary picketing.
Prior to the 1959 Amendment of this Act, this provision appeared as section 8 (b)(4)(A).
No substantive changes were made in this section by the insertion of the cease business object
in section 8(b)(4).
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work, where an object of the union's refusal or inducement is to make an
employer cease doing business with any other person. In construing this
statute, the courts have had difficulty in determining whether an objective
of union pressure has been to cause one employer to cease doing business
with another. 3 Union pressure with an object of causing a complete
termination of business relations has been held to be a clear violation of
the Act, 4 but where union activity may only foreseeably result in such
termination, it is uncertain whether such conduct will be held to violate the
meaning of the "cease doing business" phrase of 8(b)(4)(B).5
In a recent case, NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 825,1 the United
States Supreme Court held that union secondary pressure had violated the
statutory "cease doing business" language of 8(b)(4)(B) because the
foreseeable consequence of such pressure was to induce a secondary or
neutral employer to cease doing business with a primary employer.7 In this
case, Burns, the general contractor, employed three subcontractors,
Chicago Bridge, Porier, and White, on a common situs. A dispute arose
between Local 825 of Operating Engineers and White over a welding
machine work assignment made by White to the Ironworkers Union.
Local 825 claimed the work for its members and demanded that White
reassign the work and that Burns sign a contract giving Local 825
jurisdiction over all welding machine work on the site. After both
employers refused to take any action, Local 825's members employed by
all the subcontractors walked off the job. The union contended that the
object of the strike was to force White to make the work assignment and
to force Burns to change White's conduct, not to force White off the job.I
After Burns filed a complaint, the National Labor Relations Board found
that Local 825 had violated both sections 8(b)(4)(D)l and 8(b)(4)(B) of the
2See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Carpenters Union v.
NLRB, 339 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1964); Seafarers Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir.
1959).
INLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); NLRB v. Nashville Building
Council, 425 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1970); Teamsters Local 5 v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 439 (5th Cir.
1969); NLRB v. Hod Carriers Local 185, 389 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1968). In each of these
cases union conduct was held to have the object of causing a total cessation of business
between primary and secondary employers.
5See, e.g., NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 825, 326 F.2d 218, 219 (3d Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Carpenters Union, 261 F.2d 166, 172 (7th Cir. 1958).
1400 U.S. 297 (1971).
'Id. at 305.
8Id. at 301. Burns submitted the dispute to the National Joint Board for the Settlement
of Jurisdictional Disputes which was created to settle jurisdictional disputes in the
construction industry. For a discussion of the operation of the Joint Board see Lathers Local
2, 119 NLRB 1345 (1958). White's assignment to the ironworkers was affirmed and the
operating engineers then physically prevented the operation of the welding machine.
'29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1964). The Board held that the union violated this section
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Taft-Hartley Act. 10 Upon application to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit" for an enforcement order, the Board's 8(b)(4)(D) finding,
but not its 8(b)(4)(B) finding, was sustained.'
by inducing the employees of the secondary employers to strike in order to force White to
assign the disputed work to the operating engineers. Section 158(b) states:
(b), It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-(4) to induce or encourage [the employees of any employer] to
engage in, a strike or a refusal. . . to perform any service, (ii). .. where
• . . an object thereof is- . . (D) forcing or requiring any employer to
assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or
in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another
labor organization or in another trade, craft or class, unless such employer
is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining
the bargaining representative for employees performing such work ....
The Board contended that both sections 8(b)(4)(D) and 8(b)(4)(B) applied in this case. No
authority can be found which supports the contention that the Board or the courts have ever
considered either section to be mutually exclusive remedies. See NLRB v. IBEW Local 25,
383 F.2d 449,454 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1291, 332 F.2d 559, 560
(3d Cir. 1964); Plumber's Local 5, 145 NLRB 1580, 1601-02 (1964); Plumber's Local 5, 137
NLRB 828, 832 (1962). Each case involved a union jurisdictional dispute over a work
assignment which produced attending secondary pressure on neutral employers and both
8(b)(4)(B) and 8(b)(4)(D) were held to apply. It is true that 8(b)(4(D) does prohibit union
pressure, whether primary or secondary, in support of a union demand forcing a work
assignment. There is a very practical reason, however, why section 8(b)(4)(B) should also
apply. Under that section, unlike 8(b)(4)(D), a union can be enjoined, and neutral employers
relieved of secondary pressure once a determination is made by the Board that such pressure
was for an illegal object. Once a union is enjoined from exerting further pressure, the Board
or the Joint Board can proceed to determine the underlying dispute. Without a section
8(b)(4)(B) mandatory injunction, a union would be free to exert pressure pending a
determination of the work assignment dispute and the issuance of an 8(b)(4)(D) order. Cf.
Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e),
113 U. PA. L. Rav. 1000, 1039 (1965).
"Operating Engineers Local 825, 162 NLRB 1617 (1967). The Trial Examiner
disagreed with the Board in its 8(b)(4)(B) finding. He felt that the NLRB General Counsel
misled him by trying to show that union conduct had met the "cease doing business" test
and could find no evidence which would support an 8(b)(4)(B) violation. He stated that the
complaint that Local 825 had violated 8(b)(4)(B) was unfounded.
Local 825 never made any request upon Chicago Bridge, Porier, or
White to cease doing business with Burns. Such a request would have been
totally irrational . . . . [The local] never indicated it wanted White off the
job-it wanted to harass White to gain compliance with its requests. Nor
was any demand made upon Burns to cease doing business with White
... . All [the local] wanted was the work, not a substitution of
contractors nor a termination of contractual relationships between the
contractors.
Id. at 1630-31.
"NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 825,410 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1969).
"Id. at 10-11. The court held that union activity aimed at a disruption of business
relations without more was insufficient to establish an effort to compel a neutral employer to
cease doing business with a primary employer.
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The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the circuit court decision,
and stated that the lower court's interpretation of the cease doing business
phrase of 8(b)(4)(B) was too narrow. 13 The Court reasoned that it was
irrelevant that the union did not demand a total termination of the
business relations between the employers, because it was foreseeable that
the consequence of the union secondary pressure would be to induce the
neutral employers to cease doing business with the primary. While
conceding that the foreseeable consequences of some secondary pressure,
although disruptive of business relations, could be so slight that the cease
doing business requirement would not be met, 4 the court felt that by clear
implication the object of Local 825's demands was either to force Burns to
make a change in White's assignment or to terminate his contract. 5
Prior Supreme Court cases have recognized the difficulty of
determining when union secondary pressure can be said to have an illegal
objective, and have attempted to reach decisions which reflect the
congressional aim of balancing a union's right to strike and exert primary
pressure with a secondary employer's right to protection." NLRB v.
Denver Building Trades Council7 was the first case to pass on an
application of the statutory meaning of the cease doing business phrase.
In this case the union struck a general contractor who hired a non-union
subcontractor to work at a common jobsite. The union disclaimed any
illegal object and contended that its only aim was to force the general
contractor to make the project all-union. 8 The Court dealt with the
'3NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 825, 400 U.S. 297, 304 (1971).
"Id. at 304.
"For the purpose of an 8(b)(4)(B) violation, a union's object is the controlling criterion,
and the nature of the dispute is immaterial. A union may strike for any reason and not come
within the prohibition of this section, provided the union does not (i) engage in, induce or
encourage, or (ii) threaten, coerce or restrain, for an illegal object proscribed in (B), that is to
force an employer to cease doing business with any other employer. The key factor is the
objective of the union activity, NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672
(1951). In NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 1291, 332 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1964), the circuit
court enforced the Board's 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(b)(4)(D) findings that a union strike over a work
assignment of handling sugar produced secondary pressure. The court focused on whether an
object of union pressure was to force one employer to cease doing business with another. In
Plumber's Local5 v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1963) the court enforced the Board's
8(b)(4)(B) and (D) order when union secondary pressure was applied to neutral employers to
protest the subcontracting and assignment of union jobs. Justice Douglas' dissent in the
principal case indicated that no violation existed because there was no indication that an
object of union pressure was anything but the work assignment. He could find no illegal
object in the union's conduct. 400 U.S. at 406-08.
"See Steelworkers Union v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 502 (1964); Electrical Workers
Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1961).
17341 U.S. 675 (1951). In Denver, notwithstanding the union's contention, the only way
it could achieve its purpose was to force the non-union contractor off the job. Denver dealt
with a total and not a partial cessation of business.
"Id. at 688.
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problem of determining whether an objective of union pressure was to
force a secondary employer to cease doing business with a primary." The
union activity here was held to be unlawful. The Court said that the
object, even if not the sole object, of the union pressure was for an illegal
purpose because the only way that the union could achieve its objective
was to force the subcontractor off the job and cause a cessation of
business."9
The immediate effect of Denver was to immunize neutral employers
dgainst any secondary pressure by a labor union. The decision, however,
could be construed to ban a union's right to exert traditional primary
pressure whenever there are secondary effects. 2' In Electrical Workers
Local 761 v. NLRB2 [General Electric], the Court departed from Denver
in order to permit union primary pressure which caused a work stoppage
by the employees of a secondary employer231 The Court held that union
activity at a gate reserved for the employees of a secondary employer
whose work was related to the "normal" operations of the primary
employer was protected regardless of how disruptive the effect was on
business relations between the primary and secondary employer.
24
Recently, the Court in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association
v. NLRB1 also avoided Denver's interpretation of the illegal objects test
in order to allow union activity which produced secondary pressure. The
Court held that union conduct aimed at preserving work traditionally
performed by union members was protected primary activity even though
neutral employers were incidentally affected.26
"Id. at 689.
1id. at 688. Denver did not apply a per se rule so as to declare unlawful all secondary
activity. Instead, the Court merely tried to determine whether an unlawful object existed in
union picketing of a secondary employer to protest the presence of a non-union
subcontractor on ajobsite. In the principal case, the Court found an unlawful object in union
secondary conduct aimed at forcing neutral employers to change a work assignment of a
primary but not aimed at forcing the primary off the job.
"See Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4)
and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000 (1965); Note, Secondary Boycotts and Work
Preservation, 77 YALE L.J. 1401, 1404-05 (1968).
-366 U.S. 667 (1961). In General Electric, the union which had a dispute with GE,
picketed gates reserved for neutral contractors who performed maintenance work at GE's
manufacturing plant. Union pressure was held unlawful as long as the neutral's work was
related to that of the primary employer.
21d. at 672-73. In General Electric the Court adopted the "work-related" test to say
when and how a union may appeal to the employees of a secondary employer. In Denver the
Court did not consider a work-related test but focused on whether an objective of union
conduct was to cause a cessation of business between primary and secondary employers.
2Id. at 682.
-386 U.S. 612 (1967). In National Woodwork, carpenters refused to handle pre-fitted
doors relying on the work preservation clause in their contract. The Court attempted to
balance rights of employees to preserve jobsite work with protection of neutral employers.
"Id. at 644. The Court was aware that a strict application of the objects test as
1971]
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The National Labor Relations Board has not followed the approach
of either General Electric or National Woodwork in attempting to
distinguish between unlawful primary and unlawful secondary union
conduct.2 7 Instead, the Board has followed the Denver rationale which
imputes an illegal cessation of business objective to union conduct
whenever secondary pressure on a neutral employer results from a union's
dispute with a primary employer.35 In addition, a significant number of
cases decided by the courts of appeal have adopted the Board's
interpretation of the meaning of the cease doing business phrase and have
found an illegal object in union secondary pressure regardless of whether a
totalP or partial" cessation of business results. Few of these cases attempt
to make any distinction between permissible primary and impermissible
secondary union conduct.
In both Douds v. International Longshoremen3' and Retail Clerks
Local 770 v. NLRB,3 2 the courts of appeal rejected the Board's ruling that
a striking union should be deemed to have as an object the foreseeable
consequence of its acts.? In each case the court stressed the need to protect
developed in Denver would nullify employees' activities to pressure their own employers into
improving the employees' wages, hours and working conditions. The Court found that the
union objective of preserving work for its own members was protected activity and cautioned
against any reading of the statute which would foreclose that right.
aE.g., Operating Engineers Local 825, 168 NLRB 193 (1967); Northeastern Ind. Bldg.
Council, 148 NLRB 854 (1964); Plumbers Local 598, 131 NLRB 787 (1961). Since
Congress did not make any distinction between "good" and "bad" secondary pressure, the
Board has presumed illegal union secondary pressure without making a distinction between
legitimate primary activity and banned secondary activity. See 93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947)
(remarks of Senator Taft).
2Plumbers Local 5, 137 NLRB 828 (1962); Shingle Weavers Local 2580, 101 NLRB
1159 (1952). In both cases, union members walked off the job in protest of the primary
employer's decision to use contracted out work. The Board said that an object of the strike
was to cause cessation of business between employers.
2NLRB v. Nashville Bldg. Trades Council, 425 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1970); Teamsters
Local 5 v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1969).
8NLRB v. Carpenter's Union, 407 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969); Electrical Workers
Local 3, 140 NLRB 729, 730 (1963), enforced, 325 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1963). In these cases
union pressure on a neutral employer, a general contractor, was for the purpose of forcing
him to add a condition to a preexisting contract with a subcontractor. The court found an
illegal object because the addition of a term by the general contractor, even though not aimed
at a total severance of business relations, would cause a serious disruption of the preexisting
business relationship tantamount to requiring one party to cease doing business with the
other.
31224 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 873 (1955).
-296 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
"Retail Clerks Local 770 v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 368, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Douds v.
International Longshoremen, 224 F.2d 455,459 (2d Cir. 1955). In both cases a union strike
for a work assignment had similar results in causing secondary pressure on a neutral
employer, and the Board held in both cases that union pressure was for an illegal objective.
Instead of applying a rule which invalidates all union secondary pressure, each court made a
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a union's right to exert primary activity and refused to find an illegal
object when secondary pressure arose out of a primary dispute.3 A
contrary holding, it was felt, would nullify labor's right to strike because
all strikes necessarily result in some cessation of business between a
primary and a secondary employer."
NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 825 is in accord with those
Board and circuit court decisions, handed down since Denver, which have
construed the illegal object test to declare unlawful secondary pressure by
a labor union.- The court in Operating Engineers Local 825, in deciding
when union conduct changes from lawful primary into unlawful
secondary activity, stressed the element of foreseeability.37 The Court does
not adequately describe the situations in which it will be held foreseeable
that union secondary pressure will have the illegal object of causing a
cessation of business.38 The decision may be read as equating union
liability to that of a tort-feasor, which extends to damage which may
reasonably be expected to result from the conduct involved.', Applying
well-reasoned analysis of the "cease doing business-object" test. Secondary pressure may be
a side effect of a strike, but this does not mean that an object of such pressure is to cause a
cessation of business between the primary and secondary employer. If this were not so,
nearly all strikes would be unlawful because some cessation of business almost always
results. The object of an action is the concluding state which the actor seeks to bring about,
but this does not mean that every action by a secondary employer which would satisfy a
union dispute is an object of the strike.
3Cases cited note 33 supra.
3 5E.g., NLRB v. Carpenters Union, 407 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Electrical Workers Union Local 3, 325 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1963). These cases indicate that
secondary pressure often results from primary dispute between a union and his employer.
mSee note 4 supra.
37400 U.S. at 304-05.
min some labor conduct, the Court held, the foreseeable consequences of union pressure
on secondary employers were so slight that a cease doing business object would not be found.
In other instances, union pressure on a secondary employer was great enough that forcing
him to cease doing business with another employer was a foreseeable consequence. 400 U.S.
305. The Court has said, however, that some disruption of business relations is the
foreseeable result of the purest form of primary activity. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376
U.S. 492 (1964). An example of protected primary conduct would be where a union pickets a
primary employer with whom the union has a dispute. Since all strikes involve some
cessation of business, an unlawful object would not be found even if the purpose of the
picketing is to dissuade all persons from entering upon the primary employer's premises.
United Electrical Workers, 85 NLRB 417, 418 (1949); Oil Workers Local 346, 84 NLRB
315, 318 (1949). See also NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
1'400 U.S. at 304. The Court in determining when the necessary intent was present to
prove an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(B), implied that proof of specific intent
was not needed to prove a violation of the Act. The Court stressed the element of
foreseeability, in that some conduct contains the implication of the required intent and that
the natural and foreseeable consequences of certain union activity may warrant the inference
of an illegal cease to do business object. Such a concept of foreseeability is similar to a tort
19711
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such a rule, an unlawful object might be found in union secondary
pressure whenever a cessation of business between employers is likely to
occur.
40
In Douds v. International Longshoremen, 1 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit rejected the notion that a tort theory of liability should
be applied to determine whether an object of union conduct was unlawful.
The court held that since most strikes and primary activity conducted by a
labor union result in some cessation of business between primary and
secondary employers, the application of a tort rule would inhibit labor's
right to strike because a union could then be said to have had as an
objective of its conduct any cessation of business which resulted from its
secondary pressure.4"
Congress wanted to guarantee labor's right to strike and exert primary
pressure, 43 but also sought to proscribe labor's use of the secondary
boycott. The term was not expressly mentioned in the Act, but there is
little doubt however that the main thrust of 8(b)(4)(B) was to outlaw the
secondary boycott. Congress intended to outlaw the evil of expanding the
scope of a labor dispute to a remote front by inducing the employees of a
neutral employer to strike with the objective of forcing him to cease doing
business with a primary employer." Even though Congress was silent on
concept whereby the tortfeasor is held liable for all results of his acts which could be
anticipated at the time of his conduct. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 291 (3d ed. 1964).
"See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963); Radio Officer's Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,45 (1962).
4224 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1955).
121d. at 459. Judge Hand said that an application of a tort rule to union secondary
conduct was unworkable:
All strikes and "concerted refusals" to work involve some cessation of
business; that is the only sanction they can have. When Congress limited
the wrong to occasions when the cessation was an "object" of the conduct,
it excluded much indeed that the ordinary law of tort would have included.
If it had not done so, it would have made nearly all strikes unlawful.
Id.
43E.g., National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967); NLRB v.
Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964); Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S.
93, 100 (1958). The Court has interpreted congressional intent as attempting to balance
labor's rights with those of neutral employers. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1967) preserves labor's
right to strike. Furthermore, to show that Congress did not want any interpretation of
8(b)(4)(B) to foreclose a labor union's right to exert primary pressure, a proviso was added
to this section that "nothing in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where
not otherwise unlawful any primary strike or primary picketing. ... 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(B) (1964).
"It was declared unlawful for a union to "strike against employer A for the purpose of
forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer B (with whom the union had a
dispute)." Senator Taft, who sponsored the Taft-Hartley Bill, stated that the purpose of
8(b)(4)(B) was "to protect those parties who were totally unconnected with a labor dispute
between an employer and his employees." 93 CONG. REc. 4189 (1947) (Remarks of Senator
Taft).
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the intended scope and degree of pressure, either partial or total, that
would satisfy the cease doing business phrase,45 the courts have construed
8(b)(4)(B) as not completely immunizing neutral employers at the cost of
depriving labor of its rights."6
The Court's recent decision will primarily affect construction unions
on a common jobsite.17 The Board and the courts, in this delicate
situation, have found it difficult to balance union rights and those of
neutral employers in the construction trades industry where the employees
of both primary and secondary employers work side-by-side. 8 In this
industry, unions have followed the custom of respecting an affiliate's
picket line.49 Thus when one union strikes, the whole site is usually closed
and all work ceases. When a union strikes or pickets a primary employer,
even if it does not intend that all persons on the job site will respect its
picket line, the union knows that secondary pressure will be the result.0 It
would therefore seem foreseeable that during any primary strike on a job
site in the construction trades industry, secondary pressure on a neutral
employer will result, and under present law an unlawful object will be
imputed to union pressure.
A bill was introduced in Congress in 1969 which, if enacted, would
exempt construction site picketing from the activity proscribed by
8(b)(4)(B). 2 The bill's passage has been defeated due to the confusion
relating to the law of secondary boycotts, and the effect that these new
proposals will have on labor union activity and neutral employers.-,
In Operating Engineers Local 825, the Court does not delineate the
permissible limits of union secondary activity. The decision does more
than reaffirm Denver;54 rather, it implies that all union secondary
pressure, regardless of union intent, is unlawful per se whenever a
"105 CONG. REc. 6556-57 (1959).
"United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 500 (1964); cf. NLRB v. Teamsters
Local 294, 284 F.2d 887, 890 (2d Cir. 1960).
4TSee generally National Woodworkers Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967);
Carpenters Union v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1964).
'See Electrical Workers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 676 (1961). The Court
recognized the complex problem involved in common situs cases where both secondary and
primary employers work on common premises.
"Comment, Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act, 60 YALE L.J. 673, 688 (1951).
-See NLRB v. Teamsters Local 294, 284 F.2d 887, 890 (2d Cir. 1960); Seafarers Union
v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
51H.R. 100, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). As of the date of this comment, no bill has been
enacted. For a discussion of H.R. 100 see 1969 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK, at 535 (BNA
ed. 1970).
11969 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 537 (BNA ed. 1970).
uId. at 540.
mNLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). Even though the
Court relied upon Denver in the principal case, Denver can be distinguished. Notes 17-20 and
accompanying text supra.
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cessation of business is foreseeable. The Court is silent as to when an
illegal object will be held foreseeable, and therefore offers no viable test by
which a labor union can predict the lawfulness of its behavior.
Though the Court's application of the cease doing business phrase will
result in inequalities for labor unions, any balancing test must involve a
consideration of the protection of neutral employers who are innocent
parties to a labor dispute.55 The Board and the courts should attempt to
more effectively harmonize the rights of labor and secondary employers.
A strict adherence to a test which may have the effect of banning all union
secondary pressure is a threat to labor's right to strike. A more flexible
approach to this problem is the test developed in the General Electric line
of cases, which allows secondary pressure on a neutral employer so long as
such pressure is reasonably related or connected to a primary dispute
between a union and an employer.5 ' Congressional clarification may be
the ultimate means by which to resolve this conflict and the uncertainty
which has permeated the law of secondary boycotts and the permissible
scope of union conduct.
CRAIG A. NIELSEN
55Congress has expressed its concern over the unlimited use by labor of the strike and the
secondary boycott as weapons to cause wholesale disruptions and closings on jobsites.
Congress has evinced its intent to protect innocent parties to a labor dispute and limit labor's
use of economic pressure. See 117 CONG. Rac. 869-70 (1971); 93 CONG. Rac. 4198 (1947).
"In General Electric the Court attempted to balance union rights with those of neutral
employers in an effort to indicate when union secondary pressure will be held lawful. See
Notes 22-23 supra. It has been held, however, that the "work-related" test of General
Electric does not apply to a common situs in the construction industry. Markwell Hartz, Inc.
v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967).
